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COMMENTS
BLOOD GROUPING TESTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY
This comment deals briefly with the presumption that a child born
to a married couple is the legitimate issue of that marriage. The status
of this presumption in Virginia is considered in light of the Virginia
statute1 authorizing the use of blood grouping tests in certain cases
where the paternity of a child born during wedlock is at issue. The
constitutionality of such tests is not within the scope of this comment.
I. THE PRESUMPTION
In the second half of the eighteenth century, there existed at com-
mon law a very strong, but rebuttable, presumption that a child
born in wedlock was the natural and lawful issue of that marriage.
Lord Mansfield ruled that the spouses to whom a child was born
could not testify to any facts indicating illegitimacy until it was shown
that one spouse had no access to the other during the period in which
conception must have taken place. After this non-access was proven,
the spouses could testify, but their testimony could not relate to the
facts of non-access.2
The presumption enjoyed equal strength in the nineteenth century.
It could be overcome by proof that the husband was entirely absent
from the community at the time of conception, or that the husband
was impotent, or that there had been no sexual intercourse between
the husband and wife during the time conception could have taken
place.' The evidence required to overcome this presumption was in
many cases understandably absent, and the presumption, for all prac-
tical purposes, was conclusive.
In this country today, the presumption that a child born in wedlock
is legitimate is recognized in every state.4 The strength of the presump-
tion, however, varies considerably with the circumstance and jurisdic-
tion.
In certain jurisdictions the presumption has been considered con-
I VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-329.1 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
2 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777). This is known as the
Lord Mansfield Rule.
3 Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (Rolls 1846).
4 Annor., 57 A.L.R.2d 729 (1958).
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clusive,5 but these jurisdictions are in a rapidly shrinking minority.6
In most jurisdictions the presumption is rebuttable.7 The problem to
be resolved is the amount of evidence required to overcome the pre-
sumption in the particular situations where it is involved.
The legitimacy of a child born during wedlock can be an issue in
divorce cases where the ground is adultery or perhaps pregnancy un-
known to the husband at the time of marriage, and the father is one other
than the husband. Legitimacy can also be an issue in annulment or
support proceedings, or in criminal prosecutions for rape or seduction
where a child resulted from the unlawful intercourse. In any of these
proceedings, there are two general situations possible in addition to
post-marital conception. The first is conception prior to the marriage
with the wife seeking to establish that the husband is in fact the father.
A second situation is premarital conception with the wife (mother)
seeking to establish that a man other than her husband is the father.
The law that has evolved from the first situation is not entirely con-
sistent. Some courts have held that the presumption of legitimacy is as
strong as it would have been had conception occurred after marriage,"
whereas others have held that the presumption is weakened by proof
of premarital conception. Generally, the presumption, though rebut-
table, is strengthened if the husband had knowledge of the pregnancy
at the time of marriage.' ° The burden of proof is on the party seeking
to establish illegitimacy."
5 /d. at 758.
6Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657 (1960); In re Estate of Marshall, 120
Cal. App. 2d 747, 262 P.2d 42 (1953) [These cases have been modified by CAL. CODE
Crv. Paoc. §§ 1980.1-1980.7 (West 1960).]; State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N.W.
589 (1883); State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn. 299, 75 N.W.2d 195 (1956); Rhyne v. Hoffman,
59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 335 (1862); State v. Herman, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 502 (1852).
Contra, West v. Redmond, 171 N.C. 742, 88 S.E. 341 (1916); Hudson v. Hudson, 151
Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949); Schmidt v. State, 110 Neb. 504, 194 N.W. 679 (1923);
Kawecld v. Kawecki, 67 Ohio App. 34, 35 N.E.2d 865 (1941) (In these cases it seems
that the presumption was actually rebuttable but there was insufficient proof.); 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2527 (3d ed. 1940); Kidd, Some Recent Cases in Evidence, 13
CAw . L. Rav. 468, 474 (1925); 29 IowA L. REv. 121, 122 (1943).
7See, e.g., Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 581, 589 (1847); Bullock v. Knox,
96 Ala. 195, 198, 11 So. 339, 340 (1892); State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St.
305, 312, 58 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1944); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 729 (1958).
8Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (No. 13,351) (C.C. Va. 1825); Grant v. Stimpson,
79 Conn. 617, 66 A. 166 (1907); Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955);
Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Cornwall v. Cornwall, 160
Va. 183, 168 S.E. 439 (1933); Bowles v. Bingham, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 442 (1811).
9Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 160, 60 Am. Dec. 687 (1854); Jackson v. Thornton, 133
Tenn. 36, 179 S.W. 384 (1915).
10 Phillips v. State, 82 Ind. App. 356, 145 N.E. 895 (1925); Ervin v. Bass, 172 Miss.
332, 160 So. 568 (1935).
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The second general situation has also been treated with some degree
of inconsistency. Most courts recognize a rebuttable 2 presumption that
the husband, rather than a third person, fathered the child. 3 A very
unusual situation can develop when conception occurs during one mar-
riage but the child is born during a subsequent marriage to a different
man. Courts have taken divergent opinions here. In some jurisdictions
the child is presumed to be fathered by the first husband,14 whereas in
others the child is presumed to be fathered by the second.' 5
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock has been
improperly relied upon in a few cases where the child was born shortly
before the marriage. In this situation some courts have refused to apply
any presumption,'- while others have recognized only a weak one.17
There is no definite quantum of evidence required to rebut the fore-
going presumptions of legitimacy. Each case must be resolved inde-
pendently upon the strength of the competent testimony offered. 8
Courts have, however, used as a criterion for the required evidence
such phrases as clear and satisfactory testimony,10 or competent and
relevant evidence 9 or evidence that removes reasonable doubt.21 On
the other hand, courts have refused to consider the bad reputation of
the mother,22 or the stated opinion of the putative father that he was
11 See, e.g., Carnegie v. Carnegie, 261 Ala. 146, 73 So. 2d 556 (1954); In re Lentz, 247
App. Div. 31, 283 N.Y.S. 749 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
12Phillips v. State, 82 Ind. App. 356, 145 N.E. 895 (1925); State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa
46, 11 N.W. 721 (1882); Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955).
Is People ex rel. Hood v. Gleason, 211 IMI. App. 380 (1918); Parsley v. Hisch, 119
Ind. App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270 (1949); Phillips v. State, 82 Ind. App. 356, 145 N.E. 895
(1925); Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955).
'4 Darrow v. Geisen, 102 Ind. App. 14, 200 N.E. 711 (1936); King v. Peninsular
Portland Cement Co., 216 Mich. 335, 185 N.W. 858 (1921).
15 Zachmann v. Zachmann, 201 Ill. 380, 66 N.E. 256 (1903); Bower v. Graham, 285
Mo. 151, 225 S.W. 978 (1920).
16See, e.g., State ex rel. Burkhart v. Ferguson, 187 Iowa 1073, 174 N.W. 934 (1919).
17Stevenson v. Washington's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 233, 21 S.W.2d 274 (1929); Stein's
Adm'r v. Stein, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 664, 106 S.W. 860 (1908); Kotzke v. Kotzke's Estate,
205 Mich. 184, 171 N.W. 442 (1919).
Is See, e.g., State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 124 N.W.2d 355 (1963).
19Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944); Needham v. Needham, 299
S.W. 832 (Mo. App. 1927).
20 Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955).
21 Gross v. Gross, 260 S.W. 2d 655 (Ky. 1953); Phillips v. Allen, 84 Mass. (2 Allen)
453 (1861).
22 Moore v. Moore, 117 Tex. 174, 299 S.W. 653 (1927).
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in fact the father,23 or evidence that no intercourse occurred between
spouses who had access to one another.24
Virginia follows the trend of avoiding, if possible, the stigma of il-
legitimacy. Avoidance is accomplished through long standing statutory
provisions25 and the recognition of the presumption that a child born
in wedlock is legitimate.26 The court has made it unequivocally clear,
however, that legitimacy will not be presumed from illicit intercourse.
In Virginia the presumption of legitimacy is strong, but rebuttable.2 8
In at least one case the presumption of legitimacy was complemented
and strengthened by a presumption of marriage from the fact of con-
tinuous cohabitation. 29 The court has stated, however, that the presump-
tion of legitimacy may be overcome by evidence that is clear and
positive,30 or is cogent and satisfactory, 31 or shows non-access beyond
a reasonable doubt.32 Evidence that has met these standards included
proof that a mulatto child was born to caucasian spouses33 and proof
that no marriage, either void or voidable, existed when the child was
born.34 On the other hand, the court has held that the presumption
should survive testimony of the husband that a child born three months
after marriage was not his,35 and disputed testimony that the husband
was absent from the community at the time of conception.36
II. THE BLOOD GROUPING TEST
The presumption of legitimacy has no doubt resulted in inequities
because of the difficulty in sustaining the burden of proof. Certain
23 Vanover v. Steele, 173 Ky. 114, 190 S.W. 667 (1917); Rhyne v. Hoffman, 59
N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 335 (1862).
24 In re McDermott's Estate, 125 Neb. 179, 249 N.W. 555 (1933).
2 5 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7 (1968); VA. CODE § 5270 (Michie 1942); VA. CODE § 2554
(1887). These statutes provide that the issue of a void or voidable marriage are deemed
to be legitimate. See also Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948);
Cornwall v. Cornwall, 160 Va. 183, 168 S.E. 439 (1933); Goodman v. Goodman, 150
Va. 42, 142 S.E. 412 (1928); Heckert v. Hile's Adm'r, 90 Va. 390, 18 S.E. 841 (1894).
26 See, e.g., Stegall v. Stegall, 22 F. Cas. 1226 (No. 13,351) (C.C. Va. 1825).
27 Vanderpool v. Ryan, 137 Va. 445, 119 S.E. 65 (1923).
28 Cases cited notes 44, 45, and 47 infra.
29 Reynolds v. Adams, 125 Va. 295, 99 S.E. 695 (1919).
30 Scott v. Hillenberg, 85 Va. 245, 7 S.E. 377 (1888).
31 Reynolds v. Adams, 125 Va. 295, 99 S.E. 695 (1919).
32 Gibson v. Gibson, 207 Va. 821, 153 S.E.2d 189 (1967).
33 Watkins v. Carlton, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 560 (1840).
34 Patterson v. Anderson, 194 Va. 557, 74 S.E.2d 195 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
965 (1953).
3 5 Bowles v. Bingham, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 442 (1811).
36 Scott v. Hillenberg, 85 Va. 245, 7 S.E. 377 (1888).
husbands have been held responsible for fathering children who, in
fact, were products of adulterous or otherwise illicit relationships. To
combat the presumption of legitimacy in such cases, discerning at-
torneys began introducing the results of blood grouping tests for the
purpose of proving non-paternity. The issue of whether it was proper
to sustain a motion requesting the court to order such tests first reached
a court of last resort in 1933.37 The court held that it was proper
to overrule the motion because the tests had not yet been proven re-
liable.38 This skepticism was shared in other early cases where test
results were actually admitted. In those cases the court upheld findings
against men who, according to the blood test results, could not have
been the father of the child in question.39
The blood grouping test is not a new technique. It is the same test
that is used to determine blood type and RH factor. The legal value
of the test rests on the fact that blood type is an inheritable character-
istic, and thus the blood type of a child depends necessarily upon the
blood type of its natural, as compared to its legal, parents. In conduct-
ing the tests, skilled technicians determine the blood type of the mother,
of the child, and of the putative father. The results of these tests are
considered by experts in the fields of genetics and hematology. Their
findings can indicate that the child's blood type could have resulted
from genes supplied by the mother and by some third male, but
could not have resulted from genes supplied by the mother and the
putative father. This determination would tend to obviate the pos-
sibility that the putative father was the natural father.40
The medical profession has for a long time recognized that the test
techniques have been sufficiently refined to produce almost one hun-
dred per cent accuracy in determining blood types.4 The medical au-
thorities agree that the tests are effective to exonerate over fifty per
37 State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933).
38 Id.
3OSee, e.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946); Arais v.
Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937); Jordan v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57
A.2d 209 (1948).
40See, e.g., HAR=.Y, MEDIco-LEGAL BLOOD GROUP DETERMINATION 8-9, 16-19 (1943);
SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATEMrITY PROCEEDINGS 234 (3d ed. 1953); WEINER, BLOOD GRoups
AND TRANSFUSION 35-49, 190-93 (3d ed. 1943); 1 J. WAIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 165 (a) (3d ed.
1940); Denton, Blood Groups and Disputed Parentage, 27 CAN. B. REv. 537, 539 (1949);
McDermott, The Proof of Paternity and the Progress of Science, 1 How. L. J. 40, 46-47,
58 (1955); Schatkin, Law and Science in Collision: Use of Blood Tests in Paternity
Suits, 32 VA. L. REv. 886 (1946); 39 CALiF. L. REV. 277, 278 (1951).
41 ANDRESEN, THE HUMAN BLOOD GRouPs 101-04 (1952); ScHATKIN, DIsPUTED PA-
TERNIrY PROCEEDINGS 234 (3d ed. 1953).
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cent of the men who are wrongfully accused of fathering a child.4
These authorities recognize, however, that there is a very remote pos-
sibility that due to gene mutations, the test results might-tend to show
that the true father is not the father.43
The legal profession today also recognizes the value of blood group-
ing tests as evidence. The reliability and techniques of such tests are
now the subjects of judicial notice,44 and the test results, when they
exclude paternity,45 are usually given great evidential weight.40
The legal situations where blood grouping tests are quite valuable,
such as criminal prosecutions for rape or seduction and civil suits for
divorce,47 for support, 4 or for the sole purpose of establishing pa-
ternity,49 are indeed the same situations where the law frequently inter-
jects its presumption of legitimacy.
III. THE EFFECT OF BLOOD GROUPING TESTS ON THE PRESUMPTION
The effect of blood test results depends upon the strength of the
presumption. A conclusive presumption, in the few instances where
such exists, will be unaffected. On the other hand, a rebuttable pre-
sumption could be greatly affected, depending on the evidential value
allowed the test results.
Some jurisdictions by statute have declared the test results to be
conclusive when they show that the putative father was not the father.5"
In others the same result has been reached by judicial decision.5' In
42C. MCCoRMICK, EVMFNCE § 179 (1954); COMMrrrFE ON MEDICO-LEGAL PROBLEMS,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDCO-LEGAL APPLICATION OF BLOOD TESTS 16 (1952).
43 See note 53 infra.
4 4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959); Jordan
v. Mace, 144 Me. 351,*69 A.2d 670 (1949); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 NJ. Super. 152, 76
A.2d 717 (1950); Fowler v. Rizzuto, 121 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1953).45 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 115 F. Supp. 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); People v. Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954); Miller v.
Domanski, 26 NJ. Super. 316, 97 A.2d 641 (1953); C. v. C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 N.Y.S.2d
276 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Cuneo v. Cuneo, 198 Misc. 240, 96 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
1 J. Wuuvxoax, EvmENcE § 165(a) (3d ed. 1940).4 6 See, e.g., note 56 infra.
47 State v. Shanks, 437 Md. 185, 45 A.2d 85 (1945); C. v. C, 200 Misc. 631, 109
N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Dellaria v. Dellaria, 183 Misc. 832, 52 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup.
Ct. 1944).
48 Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954); Commonwealth v. Visockli, 23
Pa. D. & C. 103 (1935).
49 Complaint of Dunn, 115 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Child. Ct. 1952).50 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1967); UNnoRm Aar ON BLOOD
Tsrs To Dn-ERMInE PATERNITY 9 1-11 [hereinafter cited as UNIoRM Acr].
5 1 Ross v. Marx, 21 N.J. Super. 95, 90 A.2d 545 (1952), aff'd, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93
302.
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either case the presumption of legitimacy clearly is destroyed by the
test results. The remaining jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue
consider the tests inconclusive 52 and allow the trier of fact to determine
the evidential value of the tests. In these latter jurisdictions the test
results have still enjoyed much consideration. 3 There are some in-
stances, however, where the test results failed to overcome the pre-
sumption, even though they tended to exclude the accused as being the
father."4
At present a great number of states have enacted statutes dealing
specifically with the use of blood grouping tests. The most compre-
hensive statute on the subject is the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity.15  To date seven states have adopted this act
largely in its original form.5 6 It provides that in cases where paternity
is relevant, on motion of any person whose blood is involved or on
motion of the court, the tests can be ordered to be performed on the
mother, the child, and the putative father. The failure of a party to
comply with this order can be brought to the attention of the court.
A.2d 579 (1952). The court stated: "It is universally accepted in medical and scientific
fields that the result of a blood grouping test disproving paternity or . . . indicating
definite exclusion of parentage, is not an expression of opinion upon which experts
can differ but, rather, is the statement of a scientifically established fact. It is a
scientifically established fact just as it is a scientifically established fact that the
world is round. As such it should be accepted by the courts of law. For a court to
declare that these tests are not conclusive would be as unrealistic as it would be for
a court to declare that the world is flat." Id. at 546. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19 (1959); State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118
A.2d 596 (1955); C. v. C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Houston
v. Houston, 199 Misc. 469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).52 See, e.g., Hill v. Johnson, 102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226 P.2d 655 (1951); People v.
Nichols, 341 Mich. 311, 67 N.W.2d 230 (1954); Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103
A.2d 188 (1954); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957).
53 Beck v. Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481,
103 A.2d 188 (1954); Crouse v. Crouse, 51 Misc. 2d 649, 273 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1966) (test performed in court room); Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d
797 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1947); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 190 Pa. Super. 509, 154 A.2d 412
(1959); Commonwealth v. Viscoki, 23 Pa. D. & C. 103 (1935).
54Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946); Harding v. Harding,
22 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940), aff"d mem., 261 App. Div. 924, 25 N.Y.S.2d 525
(Sup. Ct. 1941); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957).
55 UwrnoRumr AcT §§ 1-11.
56California, CAL. CODn Civ. Paoc. 09 1980.1-1980.7 (West 1960); Illinois, S.H.A. ch.
106 3/4, § 1-7 (Cum. Supp. 1969); New Hampshire, R.S.A. §§ 522:1-522:6 (1955);
Oklahoma, 10 OiaA. SrAT. ANN. §§ 501-507 (Cum. Supp. 1969); Oregon, O.R.S.
S§ 109.250-109.262 (1967); Pennsylvania, 28 P.S. H9 307.1-307.10 (Cum. Supp. 1969);
Utah, U.C.A. §§ 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-17 (Cuts. Supp. 1969). Under FED. R. Civ. P. 35
blood grouping tests are authorized. See Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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The tests are to be performed by experts selected by the court and
by any party who is to be tested, if that party so desires to desig-
nate his own expert. When the experts agree as to the accuracy of the
test, the results are conclusive on the issue of non-paternity. If the ex-
perts cannot agree, then the jury is to consider the test results with
the other evidence.
Exclusive of those states that have adopted the Uniform Act, others
have enacted statutes authorizing blood grouping tests. The exact form
of these statutes varies considerably, yet there are some noticeable
similarities in their provisions. Almost all statutes provide that the test re-
sults are admissible only for the purpose of proving non-paternity. 1
Some provide that the court, 58 as well as the prospective subjects of
the tests, may move to have the tests performed, whereas in at least
one jurisdiction any party to the proceeding may so move.59 In any
case where paternity is relevant,60 some statutes provide that the court
in its discretion may 6' order the tests to be performed, while others de-
clare that the tests are mandatory.62 The presumption of legitimacy is
addressed squarely by several statutes and with few exceptions, 6it is
conclusively overcome by test results that exclude paternity.6 4 In some
states the use of the test is limited to certain types of cases, such as
support, 5 bastardy, 6 or paternity.67 A few states follow the Uniform
57 CODE OF ALA. tit. 27, § 12(5) (Cum. Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. § 34-705.3 (1962);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 52-1-27 (1963); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-658 (Cum. Supp. 1969); 19
M.S.A. § 257.23 (1959); M.C.L.A. § 722.716 (1968); Miss. CODE § 383-11 (Cum. Supp.
1968); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 56.010, 56.011 (1967); N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 418, 532
(1962); OHIO REV. CODE § 3111.16 (1964); W.S.A. S 325.23 (1958).
582 MD. CODE ART. 16, § 66G (1966); N.Y. FAMILY COURT AcT §§ 418, 532 (1962).
69 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
60 Am. STAT. §§ 34-705.1 to 34-705.3 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 52-184
(1958).
6 1See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 418, 532 (1962). The discretion to be used
in such cases has been declared to be sound judicial discretion and not mere personal
discretion. Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
62See, e.g., 2 MD. CODE ART. 16, S 66G (1966); N.C. GE. STAT. § 8-50.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1967); W.S.A. § 325.23 (1958).
63 OHro REV. CODE § 3111.16 (1964); State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio 305, 58
N.E.2d 773 (1944).
4 N.C. GEN. STAT. 3 8-50.1 (Cum. Supp. 1967); UNFoRm ACT § 1-11.
65 N.Y. FAMmY COURT AcT § 418 (1962).
66 OHo REv. CODE § 3111.16 (1964).




Act and allow the fact of a party's refusal to submit to the test to be
brought out in court.68
Virginia's statute60 provides that in divorce and support cases when
a question of paternity arises, the court may, on motion of either party,
regardless of any presumption in regard to paternity, order the blood"
grouping tests to be performed on the mother, child and putative
father. The tests must be performed by a licensed physician at the
cost of the moving party.
The language of this statute limits its application to only two situ-
ations: divorce and support. This limitation is extended by the fact
that Virginia has not accepted a proposa 7 0 that would allow an un-
married mother to recover child support from the father of her il-
legitimate child.71 The effect of the statute will, therefore, be felt in
cases where there is a marriage and a child born in wedlock, thereby
raising a presumption of legitimacy.12
IV. CONCLUSION
A careful reading of Virginia's statute indicates that the legislature
contemplated a conflict between the presumption of legitimacy and
blood test results. The statute, however, is silent as to the intended out-
come of this conflict. In light of the preceding considerations, it is
likely that the Virginia courts will consider the test results conclusive
when they show non-paternity. It is doubtful, however, that the court
will consider test results which indicate that the reputed father may
in fact be the father. The statute is silent as to whether the court on
its own motion may order the tests and as to whether the tests are
mandatory in any situation. On these points the attorney can expect
the court not to order the tests on its own motion, but to exercise sound
judicial discretion in considering motions from the bar for the test.
C.L.W., JR.
68 CODE OF ALA. tit. 27, § 12(5) (Cum. Supp. 1967); 2 MD. CODE Art. 16, § 66G (1966);
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 56.010, 56.011 (1967).6 9 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-329.1 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
70 VA. S. Doe. No. 5, Regular Sess. 1960, HOUSE AND SENATE DocumxNs.
71 No person shall be held for support of a child born to an unmarried mother unless
he admits paternity under oath, either in open court or in writing. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-61.1 (1960). See Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S2E.2d 79 (1944).
72 See note 37, and 39 through 48 supra.
